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THE PROPOSED PRAYER AND
BIBLE-READING AMENDMENTS:
CONTRASTING VIEWS'
I. WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.*

G ENTLEMEN:

previous testimony at this hearing, as reported in the
press, prompts me to preface my remarks by stating that I am
neither an atheist, nor an agnostic, nor a secularist, nor a Communist. I
am a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, a member of the Jesuit Order,
a lawyer and professor in the Boston College Law School. However, I do
not speak for the Catholic Church, or for the Society of Jesus, or for
Boston College. I speak for myself alone. With the exception of three
years in the United States Navy in World War II, I have been continually
and closely involved in education, as a student or as a teacher, for fiftyfour years; and for the past twenty-five years I have taught various law
courses, with a particular interest in constitutional law, especially in the
field of civil rights.
From this background, I believe that it would be a grave mistake to
change the Constitution by an amendment authorizing, in the public
schools of the country, those prayers or bible readings which were outlawed by the Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale and Abington School
District v. Schempp. I do not subscribe, by any means, to all that was said
in the opinions expressed in Engel and in Schempp, but I do agree with
the results. I do not subscribe to what seems to me the Court's uncritical
invocation of the "wall of separation" metaphor, nor to its simplistic
interpretation of the "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment, nor to its mechanistic incorporation of that clause into the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. But I do believe that the
prayers and bible readings condemned by Engel and Schempp were violative of the fundamental constitutional and personal right of the "free
exercise" of religion, expressly protected against federal action by the
first amendment, and properly protected against state action by the "due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment.
t Two statements on the proposed prayer and bible-reading amendments delivered
before the House Committee on the Judiciary on May 8, 1964 and May 14, 1964,
respectively.
* A.B., A.M., Boston College; Ph.D., Gregorian University; S.T.L., Weston College;
LL.B., Georgetown University School of Law; Professor of Law, Boston College
School of Law.
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Wherefore, prescinding from the disputes
about the "establishment" clause which
have divided constitutional scholars since
1947, I oppose any constitutional amendment which would nullify the results of
Engel and Schempp precisely because any
such amendment would seriously abridge
the constitutional "free exercise" of religion,
which is beyond all dispute a fundamental
personal right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty and essential to our pluralistic and democratic society.
For we are a pluralistic society whose
members adhere to many religions and to
none. We are a democratic society whose
members, regardless of religious faith or
lack thereof, stand equal before the law.
Therefore the constitutional free exercise of
religion means, not merely freedom of religion, but also freedom from religion as far
as state coercion or pressure is concerned.
Suppose a state should enact a statute requiring all persons within its jurisdiction to
join some church of the person's choice any church, Protestant, Jewish, Catholic,
Buddhist, or any other - but some church.
This would be freedom of religion in a restricted and Pickwickian sense, but it would
obviously not be the constitutional free exercise of religion, precisely because it would
not be freedom from religion as far as state
coercion or pressure is concerned.
So too, and for exactly the same reason,
a state enactment which would require the
profession of any religious belief, the performance of any religious ritual, the recitation of any religious prayer, the devotional
reading of (or listening to) any religious
scripture, would obviously violate the constitutional free exercise of religion. But the
free exercise of religion is a fundamental
personal right of each and every individual,
independent of political controversies, sub-
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ject to no primaries or elections, above popular passions and majority votes, beyond
the power of state officials and local school
boards, guaranteed by our Constitution and
entrusted by it to the protection of our
courts. I would not abridge it. I would keep
it intact, for the sake of ordered liberty, civic
equality, and personal dignity, in our pluralistic and democratic society.
The free exercise of religion is such a
fundamental personal right that, long before
the Supreme Court of the United States had
occasion in 1940 to hold it applicable to the
states via the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the supreme courts
of half a dozen states found compulsory religious exercises in the public schools in
violation of their respective state constitutions: Wisconsin in 1890, Illinois in 1910,
Louisiana in 1915, Washington in 1918,
South Dakota in 1929, and Washington in
1930. Compulsion is incompatible with
freedom.
It has been argued, however, that the
proposed constitutional amendments provide, not for compulsory, but for "voluntary" prayers and bible readings; that dissenting pupils may be excused from such
religious exercises; and, therefore, that religious freedom is neither denied nor
abridged. But the free exercise of religion
is not a sterile legal concept or an academic
abstraction. It is a practical freedom in the
real context of a child's life in the actual
circumstances of the elementary and secondary school. The fact that some pupils, or
theoretically all pupils, may be excused
from the officially scheduled religious exercises does not obscure the obligatory nature
of the ceremony, nor does it mitigate the
serious practical pressure upon the dissenting child to conform to the official orthodoxy.
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Seventy-four years ago the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in Weiss v. District
Board, 76 Wis. 177 (1890), put the practicalities of school life this way:
When ... a small minority of the pupils in
the public school is excluded for any cause
from a stated school exercise, particularly
when such a cause is apparent hostility to
the Bible which a majority of the other
pupils have been taught to revere, from
that moment the excluded pupil loses caste
with his fellows, and is liable to be regarded
with aversion and subjected to reproach
and insult.
Fifty-four years ago the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in Ring v. Board of Education,
245 Ill. 334 (1910), explained the same
realities as follows:
The exclusion of a pupil from this part of
the school exercises in which the rest of
the school joins, separates him from his
fellows, puts him in a class by himself,
deprives him of his equality with the other
pupils, subjects him to a religious stigma,
and places him at a disadvantage in the
school, which the law never contemplated.
All this because of his religious belief.
Forty-nine years ago the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, in Herold v. Board of School
Directors, 136 La. 1034 (1915), described
the facts in these words:
Excusing such children on religious grounds,
although the number might be very small,
would be a distinct preference in favor of
the religious beliefs of the majority, and
would work a discrimination against those
who were excused. The exclusion of a pupil
under such circumstances puts him in a
class by himself; it subjects him to a religious stigma; and all because of his religious
belief.
And eleven years ago the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, in Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31 (1953), concluded that
children of minority groups, who decline to
join in the religious activities of the school,
will be subjected to disadvantages and pressures to conform, and that a supposition to

the contrary "ignores the realities of life."
In the Tudor case the New Jersey court had
the benefit of extensive testimony by behavioral scientists concerning the effect of
such practices upon the attitudes and behaviors of school children. It would seem
that, as with the testimony of psychologists
concerning the harmful effects of racial segregation in the School Segregation Cases of
1954, the formalized data of the social scientists simply strengthened the findings of
informal experience and corroborated the
conclusions of common sense.
Moreover, I think it important to note
that the genuine religious freedom of both
child and parent is involved. The primary
right of education is parental. The Supreme
Court of the United States in the Oregon
School Case of 1925 decided unanimously
that "due process" includes the fundamental constitutional right of parents, subject to
reasonable state standards and regulations,
to choose the education of their children,
whether it shall be private or public, religious or non-religious. Freedom of educational philosophy, freedom of religion, and
freedom from religion as far as state coercion or pressure is concerned, are constituent elements of this fundamental parental
right. The state may compel a child to
attend an accredited school of the parent's
free choice; but the state may not deny or
unreasonably restrict the freedom of that
parental choice. Similarly, if the parent, for
financial or other reasons, has no actual
choice but to send his child to a public
school, the state violates his primary parental right by coercing or pressuring his child
into religious exercises against his parental
will. It is wrong in principle, wrong against
both parent and child, to force the child into
the cruel dilemma of going along with the
crowd in the classroom or of obeying his
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parent and suffering the consequences at
the hands of his unthinking classmates. I
would respect and protect the religious freedom of both parent and child.
But what of the spiritual heritage and
religious character of America? The Supreme Court itself has said, in Zorach v.
Clauson, that "we are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." Some of our religious presuppositions are set out in the Declaration of Independence, which expressly referred to God,
to the Creator, to the Supreme Judge of the
world, and expressly committed our young
nation to His Divine Providence. Despite
the cynics and the secularists, and the moral
evils existing among us, we are in fact a
predominantly religious people in our origins and in our traditions.
Nevertheless, the logic of our political
principles and constitutional law forces us
to attribute this spiritual heritage and religious character to the American people, the
American community, the American society
as such, and not to the American Constitution, the American government, the American state as such. The state derives its limited authority from society; within that
limited authority, the state governs society;
but the state is not society. One of the matters subtracted from state competence is religion. Although our society is religious, our
state is not. Neither is it secularistic or irreligious. It is religiously neutral. It has been
deliberately constituted religiously neutral,
by a religious society, precisely because religious neutrality is the essential condition of
religious freedom in a pluralistic society. As
a result, while the state can and must protect its constitutional existence and structure, it cannot coercively protect its own religious presuppositions without violating its
constitutional obligation to guarantee com-
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plete religious and ideological freedom.
The preservation and tradition of the religious heritage of America, therefore, must
depend chiefly upon the non-governmental
institutions and activities of American society: upon the church, the home, the religious
school, the groups and associations which
carry on study, discussion, teaching, writing
and publishing on matters philosophical and
theological. But the public school, as an
official agent of the religiously neutral state,
cannot, without betraying the religious neutrality of its principal, provide religious devotions or exercises of its pupils.
What then of the religious parent who
wishes to send his child to a school with a
religious atmosphere, in which religious
exercises are allowed, in which religious instruction is available along with other subjects of desirable human education? Can he,
too, enjoy the free exercise of religion as
part of his parental right to choose the education of his child? He can send his child to
a religious school, if he is financially able to
do so-or is succored by private charity. The
plight of the parent who pays his taxes, and
would like to send his child to a religious
school, but cannot afford to do so, is not
made easier by the statement in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania that "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are
available to all, not merely to those who are
able to pay." We have not yet devised or
enacted a means to provide practical freedom of parental choice of religious education for children. The principle of the G.I.
Bill of Rights seems available within constitutional limitations, but that is another and
longer topic.'
In the meantime, although I favor the
1 Kenealy, Equal Justice Under Law-Tax Aid to

Education, 7 CATHOLIC LAW. 183 (1961).
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most complete religious liberty for all parents and school children, believing or unbelieving, I think it would be most unfortunate to abridge the present religious liberty
of any by the adoption of the proposed constitutional amendments concerning prayers
and bible readings in the public schools.
With patience and civil dialogue, we may
some day realize genuine and practical religious freedom and equality for all parents
and for all school children.
II. WILLIAM B. BALL*
I am William B. Ball, a member of the
Pennsylvania and New York Bars. Formerly
a professor of constitutional law at Villanova
University Law School, I have had for several years a specialized interest in the field
of church-state relationships. Presently I
am General Counsel to the Pennsylvania
Catholic Welfare Committee. In testifying
here today I do not, however, speak for that
body nor for the Catholic Church but solely
as an individual deeply interested in the religious education of youth and strongly concerned for the integrity of our constitutional
law. My appearance here today is based
upon the assumption that while you are interested in specific arguments for or against
such specific proposals as the Becker
Amendment, you are also interested in certain broader matters relating to many of the
proposed amendments - matters pertaining
to overall constitutional policy. The focus of
my remarks is simply this:
The Supreme Court of the United States,

in a series of decisions interpreting the first
amendment, has given the nation a formulation which-carried to its strictly logical conclusions-may be useful in resolving for our
pluralist society significant problems respecting religion in education. My point today is not to defend those decisions. Even
less is it to defend much of the reasoning
upon which they are based. As a corollary,
I shall suggest that a constitutional amendment is not yet plainly necessary, but that
it will become so should the Supreme Court
yield to those who today contest its doctrine
of neutrality and who seek to bring about a
total-and thus antagonistic-separation of
church and state.
At the outset of my testimony, I join with
many others in praise of the motives which
are producing the amendment proposals and
these nationally publicized hearings. The
movement to bring about amendment is not
-as some have alleged-a product of hysteria. The movement is a tremendously significant expression of a very deep and widespread national concern. To see it as less
than this is to miss the truth of the matter.
That concern-shared, indeed, by some opponents of the movement-essentially raises
the question: how shall the religious education of American children best be aided in
a religiously free society?
We should rejoice that this great question
is at last to the fore in the minds of millions
of our citizens and hundreds of legislators
and civic leaders. It should lead us, however,
not to tinkering with the first amendment
but to a very careful look at what the Supreme Court has held the first amendment
to mean in terms of religion in education.

* A.B., Western Reserve University; J.D., Univer-

sity of Notre Dame, College of Law; General
Counsel, Pennsylvania Catholic Welfare Committee; Member of the New York and Pennsylvania
Bars.

The Court's Formulation
Essentially, the Court has said two
things: in one area, that of public education,
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an area in which for more than a century
it has been recognized that very little religion could be offered anyhow, it has gradually (in the McCollum, Engel and Schempp
decisions) evolved a declaration that the
schools must be religiously neutral. In another area, that of the church-related school,
the area in which religion in education has
enjoyed an astoundingly strong development, the Court has declared not only in
favor of parental freedom of choice of that
kind of school, but has also indicated that
such option may be exercised without arbitrary economic hindrance.
Although American education began as
church-related education which was aimed
at a total religious formation of the child,
in time it split into two sorts of education.
One-represented today by the church-related school-essentially agreed with the
vision of the founders of education on these
shores and held to the view that, as society
should be God-centered, so must be the education of its citizens. The other-represented
today by the public school-long sought to
cling to that selfsame view. In 1838 its great
leader, Horace Mann, in fact defined education to include
such a culture of our moral affections and
religious sensibilities, as in the course of
nature and Providence shall lead to a subjection and conformity of all our appetites,
propensities, and sentiments to the Will of
Heaven.
But as a school for children of different
faiths, the public school had early to wrestle
with problems relating to the showing of a
preference for any of these. The resulting
compromise in the mid-nineteenth centurythe offering of a common core of Protestant
Christian instruction and practice-pointed
at once to two things. First, it would not be
the final compromise. Second, each succes-
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sive compromise would entail a necessary
reduction of the religious content of public
education. As history testifies, the Protestant
common core was to be the subject of many
litigations by Catholics in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. In our own
day, Jews, and finally non-believers and
atheists, have sued for the ouster of religious
instruction and practice in the public
schools. The Supreme Court has now, in the
McCollum, Engel and Schempp decisions,
pronounced that the public school must be
neutral, not merely with respect to the sects,
but indeed neutral as to religion itself.
Now, as the Committee should note, this
neutrality is very broad. It is broad because
the term "religion," as used in the first
amendment, has been defined by the Court
over the decades to mean almost anything
which can be called a belief. It is broad because the Court, in many cases, has interdicted the use of governmental power to
impose conformity upon persons subject to
that power, to any philosophy, orthodoxy,
ideology or theory of society.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, then,
respecting religion in the public schools
must be read as requiring in those schools
a total respect for the individual conscience
as against imposition by those schools of any
belief or ideology. This principle must be
taken to apply not merely to prayers to God
or readings of the Bible. It excludes not only
the inculcating of values objectionable to
agnostic or atheist. It excludes with equal
force the inculcating of values objectionable
to the believer in God, even though these
may be advertised as "communitarian" values. (I do not pretend, by the way, that the
policing of this neutrality will prove any
easy task, especially in the elementary
schools where children are of an age at
which they are extremely impressionable.)
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Undoubtedly, the very nature of a religiously plural society has dictated this resuit. But the same religiously plural society
also confirms the concept of a pluralism of
schools. In 1925 this concept was denied in
the state of Oregon and the effort was there
made to require all children to attend the
"official" government school system. The
Supreme Court struck down the Oregon
statute which would have required all school
children to attend public schools. It declared
that the Constitution barred "any general
power of the state to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from
public school teachers only."
The Supreme Court of the United States
has since built upon this concept and has today indeed rendered it, for men of all religious faiths, a live and meaningful option.
Since the Pierce decision of 1925, the Court
has indicated that it may be constitutionally
permissible for government to aid secular,
general, neutral and public objectives
achieved by the church-related educational
institutions. It recognized, in the Cochran
case in 1935, the fact that public objectives
are achieved in church-related schools. It
recognized, in the Everson case in 1947, that
although the "no establishment" clause of
the first amendment dictates that no tax in
any amount, large or small, may be used for
the support of religion, nevertheless due to
the "free exercise" clause of that same
amendment children may not be barred
from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation though these benefits come to
them in the church-related schooling
process.
This total formulation by the Court respecting religion in public education and
education in religious schools has been slow
and difficult in evolving. I submit, however,
that it provides a sane and workable legal

basis for answering our complex question:
how shall the religious education of American children best be aided in a religiously
free society?
The Formulation Under Attack
But I fear that this state of our law, as
pronounced by the Court, is not satisfactory
to everyone. It has apparently displeased
those who today are seeking bible-reading
and prayer amendments. It has apparently
displeased those who would make war upon
religion and religious freedom through pushing for an extremist interpretation of the
concept of separation of church and state.
First, as to the amenders. Does not an
amendment to render permissible prayers
and bible-reading in the public schools
create an unfortunate implication? Does it
not plainly imply that a touch of officially
sponsored religion will answer the need of
American children for religious education?
Certainly if it cannot be said to answer that
need, then the nation should not go through
the vast exertion of changing its fundamental law in order to accomplish, through
amendment, lesser and more speculative
results.
Most certainly we should acknowledge
the value in our public schools of some sort
of reminder of God and of human dependence upon Him. But the prayer and biblereading amendments will not assure this,
nor can they assure it, consistently with the
liberties of all children and all parents. The
Engel and Schempp decisions did not terminate practices which were universal or
even widely pursued in our public schools.
Though these decisions, for some, terminated meaningful reminders and actual praying, for others they terminated nothing whatsoever. If such describes the status quo
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ante, now to be restored by a constitutional
amendment, it is most questionable whether
that picture reflected any real concern of
parents or society for the religious formation
of American children. If there is sadness at
the present that the option to pray has been
terminated, the tears are belated indeed; but
the Court should not be looked upon as their
cause. Religion large and meaningful-religion intellectual and permeant-had fled the
public schools decades before the Court
pronounced victories for the Engel and
Schempp families.
At this point, let us note the testimony of
those who say that the Justices, in the
Schempp case, threw open doors to promising vistas for religion in the public educational processes. One of these, so it is said,
consists of courses in comparative religion,
or in teaching "about" various religions.
Another looks to the permissible introduction of religion through courses in the humanities, history and so forth. But it is the
feeling of many persons that these possibly
permissible introductions of religion will
share one striking feature in common with
the impermissible bible and prayer practices: they will be of little value in terms of
providing the kind of religious formation
which many people wish their children to
have. They may indeed help create understanding between children-and that will be
all to the good-but it cannot be assured that
they will create an understanding of religion.
It is clear that the public school must tread
most lightly in this respect. Under existing
Supreme Court prescriptions, while conceivably it may compare religions, it may not
compare one adversely to others or all favorably to none. Nor dare it, in teaching
"about" religion, move from a base of the
most delicately poised neutrality. Use of the
humanities to bring in God and religions is,
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of course, nothing new, nor is it in any way
compensatory for a deemed loss of religion
resulting from the banns of Engel-Schempp.
What I have suggested, therefore, is that
it may be vain to look to our public schools
for religion in the sense that many seriously
religious parents conceive that term. This
is true whether it appears through the "teach
about" technique, through the humanities
or through subliminal shots of bible-text.
Perhaps, however, the trauma experienced by many from the Supreme Court decisions will spur strong new home-andchurch efforts in religious education. We
must certainly hope so. Perhaps the widespread experimentation now contemplated
for bringing appreciation of religion and the
religious into the public schools will yield
greater results than now appears likely. Certainly all good efforts to aid our public
schools in their immense undertaking should
receive sympathetic encouragement.
We must note, however, that already
ultra-separationism is at work attacking the
Court's formulation which, with all of the
difficulties it raises, is probably the best legal
resolution achievable. Wall-eyed separationists, mesmerized by their own relentless
logic, now seek to oust every vestige of religion from relationship with the public order.
Their campaign is directed not only at the
church-related school but indeed promises
still more difficulties for the public school.
Unhappily, occasional expressions in some
Supreme Court opinions give the ultraseparationists toehold premises from which
to proceed. For example, there is the expression in the Schempp opinions that religion is a matter for home and altar and that
it impliedly has no proper role in the public
order. Yet when the specific holdings of the
Court are examined, it is seen that they give
no real support for the extreme positions

CONTRASTING VIEWS

claimed.
Instead of more litigating or more amendment-seeking, we ought to try for a while to
live with the formulation which the Court

LET US PRAY
(Continued)
recipients of government subsidies some
constitutional restrictions incumbent upon
the subsidizing government, it could occur
that parochial schools receiving general
government subsidies would be as fully
bound by the secularizing mandate of the
16
first amendment as are the public schools.
Moreover, to imply that Catholics are not
directly and greatly concerned about the
quality of the public school system is to
imply that the Catholic commitment to
parochial schools involves a partial abdica16 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961), holding that a tenant operating a restaurant on state-owned property is
bound by the fourteenth amendment in the same
way as the state and cannot discriminate racially
in its service of customers; in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Simkins, 376 U.S. 938 (1964),
reversing 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in
which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that a private hospital receiving funds under
the Hill-Burton Act is bound by the fifth and

has given us and seek to work out the details
of its principles which, it must be remembered, are of neutrality-not antagonismtoward religion.

tion of civic responsibility. Also, the Catholic who considers himself only lightly affected by the public prayer controversy does
so in disregard of the fact that there is involved an issue that goes much deeper than
the condition of any or all schools, and that
is the issue of whether the state shall recognize that there is a God, a standard of
right and wrong higher than the state itself.
This is an issue that concerns all citizens of
whatever religious persuasion. The times
require a realization by all Catholics, including the Catholic attorney, that some causes
are more important even than the pursuit
of a federal subsidy.
fourteenth amendments, because of, among other
things, the "massive use of public funds and
extensive state-federal sharing in the common
plan . . ."; bills are pending in Congress, such as
H.R. 4586, introduced by Representative William
F. Ryan, of New York City, which would deny
federal aid to any educational institution which
discriminates against any student or prospective
student "on account of such individual's race, religion, color, ancestry, or national origin." (Emphasis added.)

